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State Legalization of Marijuana as a
“Diagonal Federalism” Problem 
Brannon P. Denning*
When I hear the term “vertical separation of powers,” I think primarily 
of how the Constitution allocates power within our federal system, as 
opposed to horizontal separation of powers, which allocates power among 
the branches of the federal government. But federalism itself has vertical and 
horizontal dimensions as well. Vertical federalism concerns the allocation of 
power between the national government and those of the states.1 Horizontal 
federalism, by contrast, concerns the states’ relationships with one another.2
The Constitution and constitutional law address both aspects. Article I, for 
example, enumerates powers that are given to Congress;3 while, say, Article 
IV addresses interstate comity in various ways.4
But some issues implicate both aspects of federalism. This essay will 
discuss one: the state-level push to decriminalize the use of marijuana for 
medical and recreational purposes. I suggest that it ought to be regarded as a 
“diagonal federalism” problem calling for multi-dimensional solutions. 
What I am calling diagonal federalism is simply my too-clever-by-half 
term for an issue—like legalization of marijuana—that implicates 
federalism’s vertical and horizontal axes.5 In this regard, marijuana occupies 
a space not unlike that of alcohol in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
         *     Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University. This is a 
revised and lightly footnoted version of remarks made at the “Separation of Powers” Symposium at 
Florida International University College of Law on March 11, 2016. It draws on two previously published 
articles. See Brannon P. Denning, Vertical Federalism, Horizontal Federalism, and Legal Obstacles to 
State Marijuana Legalization Efforts, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 567 (2015); Brannon P. Denning, One
Toke over the (State) Line: Constitutional Limits on “Pot Tourism” Restrictions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2279 
(2014). Thanks to Professor Elizabeth Price Foley for the kind invitation to participate, and to the staff of 
the FIU Law Review for their gracious hospitality and skill in organizing the symposium. 
1 Allan Erbsen defines it as “how power is or should be allocated between the federal and state tiers 
of government, and how to prevent the federal and state governments from encroaching on each other’s 
prerogatives.” Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 502 (2008). 
2 See generally id.; Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal 
Federalism, 113 MICH. L. REV. 57 (2014). 
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1–18. 
4 U.S. CONST. art. IV; see generally Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate 
Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468 (2007). 
5 Hari Osofsky uses the same term, but gives it much more sophisticated and theoretically rich 
treatment. See Hari Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change Implications for the Obama 
Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237 (2011). 
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centuries.6 As was true of alcohol, failure to appreciate the diagonal nature of 
the problem may produce suboptimal policies, public backlash, or both. In 
this essay, I describe the vertical and horizontal federalism aspects of 
legalizing cannabis and then suggest what I hope are some thoughtful 
diagonal federalism responses that involve both states and the federal 
government. 
I.
The vertical federalism aspects of marijuana are fairly well known. 
Under the Controlled Substances Act7 (CSA), marijuana is still a Schedule I 
drug, meaning it has no recognized medical use.8 Its sale, possession, 
manufacture, and distribution, therefore, are illegal.9 The Supreme Court has 
twice refused to imply any exceptions to the CSA based on state laws 
permitting the use of medical marijuana.10 In 2001, for example, in United 
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, the Court refused to 
recognize a medical necessity defense to prosecution under the CSA for a 
defendant authorized to purchase or sell marijuana under state law.11 If there 
is any medical necessity defense to be had, it is one that Congress should 
create, the Court concluded. 
In its 2005 decision in Gonzales v. Raich, the Court upheld the power of 
Congress to regulate local, noncommercial production, distribution, and 
possession of marijuana under the Commerce Clause.12 It rejected arguments 
6  For the Supreme Court’s treatment of state alcohol regulation prior to the ratification of the 
Eighteenth Amendment, and the limits it imposed on that regulation, see OWEN M. FISS, 8 THE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED
BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910, at 261–92 (1993); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL &
BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., 9 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 1910–21, at 531–47 (1984) 
(discussing constitutional issues surrounding the proposal and ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment 
and Prohibition). 
7  21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2012). 
8  United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 491–92 (2001) (discussing 
significance of marijuana’s classification as a Schedule I drug). 
9  Jonathan H. Adler, Introduction, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 505, 506 (2015) (“The use, 
possession, cultivation, and sale of marijuana remains illegal under federal law. . . . Cultivation and 
distribution of marijuana are felonies, and CSA violations may authorize asset seizure.”). 
10 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005) (“[L]imiting the activity to marijuana possession and 
cultivation ‘in accordance with state law’ cannot serve to place respondents’ activities beyond 
congressional reach. The Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict between 
federal and state law, federal law shall prevail.”); Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. at 491 (“[A] 
medical necessity exception for marijuana is at odds with the terms of the Controlled Substances Act. The 
statute, to be sure, does not explicitly abrogate the defense. But its provisions leave no doubt that the 
defense is unavailable.”) (citation omitted). 
11 Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. at 491. 
12 Raich, 545 U.S. at 22. 
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that state law authorizing such impacted the scope of federal power to 
regulate interstate commerce. Justice Stevens wrote that 
limiting the activity to marijuana possession and cultivation “in 
accordance with state law” cannot serve to place respondents’ activities 
beyond congressional reach. The Supremacy Clause unambiguously 
provides that if there is any conflict between federal and state law, 
federal law shall prevail. It is beyond peradventure that federal power 
over commerce is “superior to that of the States to provide for the 
welfare or necessities of their inhabitants,” however legitimate or dire 
those necessities may be.13
Marijuana’s continuing illegality under federal law has far-reaching and 
potentially serious effects on those who choose to operate “canna-
businesses” in states where it is legal to do so. For example, if you are a 
Colorado dispensary owner you essentially operate an all-cash business 
because you are deprived of access to the banking system.14 Dispensaries in 
Denver and elsewhere in Colorado spend enormous sums each year on 
security.15 Consider, too, the implications of having lots of businesses that 
operate on an all-cash basis. The federal government has warned states that 
choose to legalize marijuana to take steps to prevent organized crime from 
using dispensaries as vehicles for money laundering.16
Marijuana’s illegality impacts canna-businesses’ ability to access legal 
services as well.17 Under Rule 1.2(d) of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct—some version of which is in effect in nearly all states—lawyers are 
prohibited from helping their clients break the law.18 Because marijuana 
remains illegal, states have taken the position that, state law notwithstanding, 
lawyers are unable to provide legal services such as drafting and negotiating 
for clients involved in the cannabis trade.19 Some states are relaxing their 
interpretation of those rules,20 but it still represents something that lawyers 
13 Id. at 29 (quotations omitted). 
14 See generally Julia Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
597 (2015). 
15 Id. at 601 (“From vaults, to cameras, to security personnel, to finding suppliers that accept cash 
payment, managing cash can quickly become a logistical and security nightmare.”) (citation omitted).
16 Id. at 601–03 (describing regulatory difficulties attending the all-cash nature of canna-
businesses); infra notes 21–22 and accompanying text (discussing federal enforcement priorities outlined 
in the Cole Memorandum). 
17 See generally Chris Hildebrand, Hazy Ethics: Access to Legal Counsel for Marijuana 
Businesses, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 583 (2015). 
18 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (“A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, 
or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent . . . .”). 
19 Hildebrand, supra note 17, at 591–92 (discussing states taking a strict view of Rule 1.2(d)). 
20 Id. at 592–95 (discussing movement in states to permit lawyers to provide legal services to 
clients despite continued federal illegality of marijuana). 
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have to think about when they are advising their clients’ canna-businesses. 
There is also some risk of federal prosecution. The Department of 
Justice finally issued some guidance in 2013 with the so-called “Cole 
Memorandum.”21 That document laid out federal enforcement priorities and 
stated that as along as state experimentation did not involve any of the eight 
areas listed (access by minors and diversion to states where it is illegal are 
two), it was prepared to allow those experiments to continue.22 But the Cole 
Memorandum is worth no more than the paper on which it is written. If the 
Hillary Clinton administration decides that legalization has not been 
successful, she can order the memo revoked, shut down dispensaries, and 
arrest their owners overnight. 
Even if you do not operate a dispensary, but simply patronize one, you 
are at risk for prosecution. Unlawful users of controlled substances, for 
example, are prohibited from owning firearms.23 The Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives is on record stating that medical marijuana 
users are prohibited from purchasing or possessing guns.24 Thus, states that 
have legalized marijuana have inadvertently exposed some of their citizens 
to prosecution for federal firearms offenses that can carry hefty prison terms. 
Even with the Cole Memorandum, the combination of state legalization 
and continued federal prohibition creates that sort of weird legal twilight zone 
noted by David Bernstein.25 This odd standoff between experimenting states 
and the federal government gives rise to what is perhaps the most interesting 
and difficult question of all: What is the preemptive effect of the CSA vis-à-
vis state legalization regimes? In Raich, Justice Stevens wrote that “[t]he 
Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict 
between federal and state law, federal law shall prevail.”26
Does that mean that Colorado’s creation of this legal recreational 
marijuana scene is preempted by the CSA? If so, what is the practical effect 
of that preemption? The answers to those questions are not entirely clear. 
21 Memorandum from James C. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, to All 
United States Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013), www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/305201382913275685
7467.pdf.
22 The others were (1) preventing proceeds from going to organized crime; (2) preventing state-
authorized sales from becoming cover for other illicit drug sales; (3) preventing violence and use of 
firearms in connection with production and distribution; (4) preventing drugged driving; (5) preventing 
growing on public lands; and (6) preventing possession or use on federal property. Id.
23 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (2012). 
24 Open Letter to All Federal Firearms Licensees, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS
AND EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 21, 2011), www.atf.gov/file/60211/download. 
25 David E. Bernstein, The Abuse of Executive Power: Getting Beyond the Streetlight Effect, 11 
FIU L. Rev 289 (2016). 
26 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005). 
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Early state court decisions took the position that state law legalizing 
marijuana created either an explicit conflict with or at least was impliedly 
preempted by the CSA. The Oregon Supreme Court, for example, held in 
2010 that an employer that discharged an employee for medical marijuana 
use had not engaged in unlawful employment discrimination because the 
Oregon law permitting medical marijuana use was implicitly preempted by 
the CSA.27
The CSA’s preemptive effect has also come up in the suit by Nebraska 
and Oklahoma against Colorado.28 Those states (ultimately unsuccessfully29)
asked  the Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and to settle the 
question of the CSA’s preemptive effects. The states argued that Colorado’s 
legalization of marijuana was in direct conflict with the CSA and could not 
stand.30
While the case for there being an express conflict between state and 
federal law is weak (the CSA does not forbid state legalization efforts) and 
because it is technically possible to comply with both regimes (if one does 
not engage in the activities permitted by state law),31 it seems to me that state 
legalization at least serves as an obstacle to the purpose of the CSA, which 
was to eliminate the market in Schedule I substances.32
The question of preemption is further complicated by the anti-
commandeering principle.33 Because states retain some aspects of 
sovereignty, they cannot be made field offices of the federal government. 
That is, they cannot have their legislative or executive branches 
commandeered by Congress to enact legislation or enforce federal law. 
Congress, for example, could not pass a law requiring states legislatures, like 
Colorado’s, to recriminalize marijuana, or require Colorado law enforcement 
personnel to enforce the CSA in the state. If the federal government wants to 
see the CSA enforced, it has its law enforcement agencies and Justice 
Department prosecutors who can do just that. 
27 Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 531–32 (Or. 2010) 
(en banc). 
28 Neb. & Okla. v. Colo., 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016) (Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting from denial of 
cert).
29 Richard Wolf & Trevor Hughes, Justices Won’t Hear Nebraska, Oklahoma Marijuana Dispute 
with Colorado, USA TODAY (Mar. 21, 2016), www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/03/21/marijuana-
lawsuit-colorado-oklahoma-nebraska-supreme-court/81984006.
30 Denning, Vertical Federalism, Horizontal Federalism, supra note *, at 574–75. 
31 Id. at 578–80.
32 Id. at 579–81. But see Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y (2013); Ernest A. Young, Modern Day Nullification: Marijuana and the 
Persistence of Federalism in an Age of Overlapping Regulatory Jurisdiction, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
769, 784–90 (2015). 
33 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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Thus, commentators have argued that the anti-commandeering principle 
really limits the preemptive effect of the CSA as a practical matter.34 If 
Oklahoma and Nebraska had succeeded in getting the Court to take their case, 
and they got some sort of order scrapping Colorado’s regulatory regime, the 
result would be the worst of both worlds because it would mean a completely 
unregulated market. A vacuum would exist as a result of preemption because 
Colorado could not be forced to reinstate criminal penalties and it would fall 
on the federal government to enforce the CSA within Colorado’s borders. 
The result, so the argument runs, would be the marijuana equivalent of the 
Age of the Saloon, to which Prohibition was a reaction and proponents of 
repeal sought to avoid when alcohol again became legal. I am not sure that 
that argument carries much force because I think that neither state lawmakers 
nor the federal government would allow a completely unregulated marijuana 
market to exist in a state. 
II.
Those are the vertical federalism problems, and I think they are quite 
serious. The preemption issue, in particular, is complicated. In addition, there 
are horizontal federalism aspects to legalized marijuana, which I will 
describe briefly. 
Much like attempts to regulate alcohol in the years preceding 
Prohibition, states are grappling with problems of cross-border externalities 
generated when legalizing and prohibiting states are living cheek-by-jowl. 
This is not merely an issue of comity because the federal government will be 
on the lookout for spillover effects from one state into another.35 Colorado 
tried to address this by limiting the amounts that nonresidents can buy per 
dispensary visit. A resident of Colorado can purchase from a dispensary in a 
single transaction the one ounce that the resident is able to possess legally. A 
nonresident will have to go to four different dispensaries because each is 
allowed to sell a nonresident only a quarter ounce per visit.36
Colorado’s efforts to prevent diversion by pot tourists could run into 
constitutional problems. A particularly astute student of constitutional law 
will recognize that there is a potential Dormant Commerce Clause problem 
lurking in the Colorado law—and perhaps a Privileges and Immunities 
Clause problem as well. Courts generally take a dim view of state or local 
laws that explicitly treat nonresidents worse than residents, and I have argued 
that Colorado’s provision—and I am sure that other states will adopt similar 
34 Mikos, supra note 32; Young, supra note 32. 
35 See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text (describing the Cole Memorandum). 
36 Denning, One Toke, supra note *, at 2281–83 (describing Colorado’s restrictions). 
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provisions to combat diversion—could face constitutional challenges.37
However, I also argue that Colorado has strong arguments supporting this 
differential treatment.38 The Dormant Commerce Clause exists primarily to 
thwart state economic protectionism.39 Colorado is not trying to hoard 
marijuana for its citizens, in a bid, say, to drive down the price; nor is it 
attempting to give some economic advantage to in-state marijuana growers 
that it denies to those who come to Colorado from out of state. Rather, the 
state is trying to avoid scrutiny from the federal government and trouble with 
neighboring states that have chosen a different policy. 
III.
What possible solutions exist to this diagonal federalism problem? For 
me, solutions would involve loosening both vertical and horizontal 
constraints to experimentation; in theory, this experimentation will in turn 
produce optimal policies that can be replicated. Here is where I think 
marijuana could take a page from the history of alcohol regulation.40
Congressional exemptions from the CSA for states that pursue 
legalization, provided that they regulate marijuana responsibly, would 
obviously be most helpful.41 Models of this cooperative federalism can be 
found in environmental statutes.42 An opt-out would be an easy and elegant 
solution and might solve the attendant problems related to continued federal 
criminalization that plague businesses in states that have decided to legalize 
marijuana. 
In addition, one of the big problems prior to Prohibition—one which 
might have hastened its appearance—was the inability of states to effectively 
37 Id. at 2283–94 (describing possible challenges to the restrictions on non-resident purchase). 
38 Id. at 2294–99 (sketching a possible defense to a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge). 
39 McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1719 (2013) (noting that the Dormant Commerce Clause 
“is driven by a concern about ‘economic protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit 
in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors’”) (citation omitted). 
40 One unlikely possibility is to propose and ratify a constitutional amendment, similar to the 
Twenty-first Amendment, clarifying both the legal status of marijuana and which level of government is 
primarily responsible for its regulation. However unlikely, that option should not be dismissed out of hand. 
I think that the constitutionalization of the repeal of Prohibition forced lawmakers to grapple with practical 
problems that would attend repeal, including who would do most of the regulating. The amendment 
process forced lawmakers to think through all of the repeal’s implications and make policy choices based 
on those implications. For some discussion of the (arduous) amendment process’s value, see Brannon P. 
Denning & John R. Vile, The Relevance of Constitutional Amendments: A Reply to David Strauss, 77 
TUL. L. REV. 247 (2002). 
41 See Alex Kreit, What Will Federal Marijuana Reform Look Like?, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
689, 706–09 (2015). Other possibilities Kreit mentions include using appropriations riders to prevent 
enforcement of marijuana laws, permitting the sort of affirmative defense that the Supreme Court refused 
to imply in Oakland Cannabis, and directing federal regulation of marijuana. 
42 See generally Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 
UCLA L. Rev. 74 (2015); Young, supra note 32. 
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prevent importation of liquor. In a number of Supreme Court cases, the 
Dormant Commerce Clause was invoked to block state efforts to keep 
alcohol out. The enforcement problems these rulings created for states proved 
intractable.43 Congress eventually passed the Wilson Act44 and then the 
Webb-Kenyon Act,45 which disabled the Dormant Commerce Clause and 
permitted states to enforce its liquor laws against cross-border traffic.46
Congress should consider similar statutes to accompany any op-outs from the 
CSA as an aid to states wishing to legalize marijuana for their citizens but 
which do not wish to become pot tourism destinations. Such statutes would 
similarly be a boon to states wishing to remain “non-toking” in the event that 
marijuana were to be legalized nationwide. 
43 These cases are described in Denning, Vertical Federalism, Horizontal Federalism, supra note 
*, at 589–91. 
44 Wilson Act of 1890, 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2012). 
45 Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913, 27 U.S.C. § 122 (2012). 
46 The Dormant Commerce Clause is a default rule. Congress may exercise its affirmative 
commerce power to permit state and local governments to take action the Dormant Commerce Clause 
would otherwise prohibit. See Prudential Ins. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946). 
